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The case studies described in this paper investigate the evolution of the knowledge bases of the 
two leading EU robotics firms - KUKA and COMAU. The analysis adopts an evolutionary 
perspective and a systems approach to examine a set of derived patent-based measures to explore 
firm behavior in technological knowledge search and accumulation. The investigation is 
supplemented by analyses of the firms' historical archives, firm strategies and prevailing economic 
context at selected periods. Our findings suggest that while these enterprises maintain an outward-
looking innovation propensity and a diversified knowledge base they tend to have a higher 
preference for continuity and stability of their existing technical knowledge sets. The two 
companies studied exhibit partially different responses to the common and on-going broader 
change in the robotics industry (i.e. the emergence of artificial intelligence and ICT for application 
to robotics); KUKA is shown to be more outward-looking than COMAU. Internal restructuring, 
economic shocks and firm specificities are found to be stronger catalysts of change than external 
technology-based stimuli. 
 
JEL Codes: O33, L52, L63 
Keywords: Innovation strategies, robotic industry, digital manufacturing, industrial robots 
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1. Introduction 
Robotics has advanced significantly since the first mechanical systems were conceived. Several 
but related technological breakthroughs in engineering, computer science, information technology, 
and related sciences have expanded the robotics value proposition. Most recently, the continued 
development of more advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and machine 
learning (ML), are providing new possibilities which could revolutionize the current industry 
(Estolatan et al. 2018).  
 
Defining a robot remains difficult. Joe Engelberger, the visionary of the industrial robot, once said, 
“I can’t define a robot, but I know one when I see one.” There are various confounding technical 
factors that stand in the way of a definition (Wilson, 2015) and different informants have their own 
ideas (Pearson, 2015). However, a clear definition is crucial in the contemporary landscape and 
because of the increasing role that robots will play in future production. The robotics sector is 
considered one of the main drivers of digital manufacturing, an environment which promises to 
deliver not only automated but also intelligent modes of production (Schwab, 2017); robots are 
regarded as exemplar ‘physical’ components in the factories of the future.1  
 
Not surprisingly, robots are central to conversations about next-generation manufacturing. Much 
of the excitement about robots among the public revolves around either a fascination with newer-
generation robots’ capabilities (such as interactivity, autonomy, and intelligence), or negative 
attitudes to their probable replacement of existing jobs. However, there is a notable absence of 
inquiry regarding the true capabilities of the firms that are expected to deliver these machines, i.e. 
the robot companies. There is a tendency to assume that these ‘black box’ will remain continuously 
innovative and competitive (Violino, 2016). 
 
This paper tries to fill some of this gap by studying the evolution of the knowledge bases (and 
associable behavior) of the two leading European robotics firms, KUKA and COMAU, and 
developments within the sector more broadly. We are interested in these organizations’ probable 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we focus mainly on robots in industrial manufacturing although we acknowledge that they are likely 
to have a major impact on the service industry. However, for reasons of space, we do not discuss this application 
extensively here.  
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responses to their contemporary environment. Are there historical antecedents that validate the 
expectation that robotics companies can deliver radical innovations easily? Can they be expected 
to revolutionize manufacturing completely? Are the latest attention-grabbing robots reported in 
the media representative of where the industry is now or might in ten years’ time? The answers to 
these questions could help to explain why development and innovation in digital manufacturing-
related areas remain captive within select institutions and regions.  
 
We rely on a theoretical framework based on an evolutionary and a ‘systems’ perspective on 
innovation to understand how firms’ knowledge bases and accumulation strategies have changed 
over time. We operationalize our model through two case studies based on firm patents, historical 
records, and the broader industrial context. The analysis is centered on industry robots (IRs) – 
generally regarded as intermediate products within a broader user-producer interaction framework. 
While the importance of service robots (SRs) is increasing, here, we are more interested in 
industrial robots which currently comprise much of the industry.  
 
The present study adds to the growing body of work which uses patent data to investigate firms’ 
innovative behavior. The novelty of our contribution lies in the integrated framework we develop 
which combines a variety of objective patent-based analytical measures with rich case studies 
based on historical archives. This provides the reader with a holistic and detailed study of the 
evolution of firms’ knowledge bases over time.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief theoretical review 
of firms’ accumulation of technological knowledge. Section 3 describes the contemporary robotics 
landscape. Section 4 formulates the hypotheses and presents the methodology. Section 5 
investigates the firm case studies. Section 6 provides a brief discussion and concludes. 
 
2. Accumulation of technological knowledge and innovation strategies 
By adopting an evolutionary approach, we view the enterprise as a behaviorally-constrained entity 
routinely seeking competitive advantage. It relies on established routines to reduce its internal 
tensions and to navigate its unfolding and uncertain market environment (Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Firms routines are rooted in their existing technical knowledge base and they are likely to choose 
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new combinations which approximate that knowledge base and allow the organization to 
accumulate a particular set of related capabilities (Dosi, 1988; Dosi, Nelson & Winter, 2001) which 
dictate a specific irreversible direction (Nishimura & Ozaki, 2017).  
 
Sectoral systems approaches highlight latent stakeholders’ feedback mechanisms and learning 
processes related to innovation activity. Internal-based learning dynamics such as ‘learning-by-
doing’ (Arrow, 1962), ‘learning-by-using’ (Rosenberg, 1982) and Lundvall’s (1985) ‘learning-by-
interacting’ processes reduce costs to the firm and reinforce (or weaken) the existing structures to 
allow realization of overall system stability (or dissolution) (Fagerberg, 2006). The established 
routines and the underlying learning processes determine how the firm responds to the various 
emergent innovations which might be in the form of continuous improvements to existing goods 
(‘incremental’ innovations) or revolutionary changes which transform productions processes (or 
‘radical’ innovations) (Fagerberg, 2006). Early Schumpeterian thought was predisposed 
particularly towards radical innovation, but more recent discourses have put progressive emphasis 
on incremental innovation (Rosenberg, 1976).     
 
Relatedly, how the firm leverages its accumulated knowledge base to respond to a given set of 
possibilities is influenced also by the underlying opportunity costs and the environmental context 
of the choice. In the phases of decision making, the firm needs to balance exploitation and 
exploration activities: choosing between using its existing capabilities to act on the best alternative 
at the time or postponing and waiting for more uncertain (but potentially more fruitful) 
opportunities to emerge (March, 1991).  
 
The firm’s choices are confounded by a variety of dimensions related to its preferences and 
decision-making. These dimensions include the relational dynamics which influence the strategic 
allocation of resources (strategic control), the prevailing organizational process related to 
collective learning (organizational integration), the degree of financial commitment to innovative 
alternatives (financial commitment) (Lazonick, 2005), the ability of the firm to identify, integrate, 
and exploit new information (absorptive capacity) (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and the 
transferability and reuse (or ‘stickiness’) of the information (von Hippel, 1994). 
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Regardless of the innovation being introduced and the choices it involves, the literature highlights 
the value for the firm to maintain diverse technological capabilities – especially in formulating the 
appropriate responses to these stimuli. Investigation from an evolutionary perspective hold that 
innovative organizations are able to exploit a diverse set of technologies (Dosi, 1982; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982). Successful firms’ comparative advantage is built on their organizational ability to 
combine large sets of technological competencies (Pavitt, 1991), and to incorporate new 
technologies into existing processes (Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 2008). The most 
resilient enterprises in the contemporary environment are those that are able to achieve a dynamic 
balance between these two inherently conflicting capabilities, both of which are necessary to 
maintain competitive advantage in both mature (through incremental innovation) and emergent 
(through discontinuous innovation) markets (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). 
 
Several empirical studies examine these dimensions to understand the relationships among the 
above dynamic capabilities and firm performance. However, the results of these studies are mixed 
and inconclusive. Several scholars find a significant and positive relationship between the firm’s 
dynamic capabilities and sales growth for both selected manufacturing industries and the sector as 
a whole (among others, Katila & Ahuja, 2002, Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001, He & Wong, 2004; 
Greve, 2007), for publicly-traded corporations (Uotila et.al., 2009), and high-technology industries 
(Cardinal, 2001). However, there is no consensus over which approach best distinguishes the 
individual effect of each aspect in relation to firm success. The meta-review in Gupta et al. (2006) 
describes the difficulty as stemming primarily from a lack of consensus on the methods that should 
be used and assumptions that need to be made to observe these capabilities.  
 
There is another stream of work which focuses on identifying the technological and sectoral 
specificities related to innovation and knowledge accumulation (Fagerberg, 2006). Most propose 
sector-based categorizations such as Pavitt’s (1984 external sources-focused taxonomy, while 
others distinguish firms based on their likely responses to various environmental stimuli (Benner 
& Tushman, 2003), or firm age (among others, Zahra, 1996 focuses on the differentiated 
innovative behavior of independent and corporate ventures while Rothaermel, 2001 studies entrant 
compared to incumbent firms). This literature strand provides a more nuanced differentiation 
among sectors, and in particular, a more detailed view of the propensities of ‘high technology’ 
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industries. For example, this allows a clearer distinction between the electronics industry and the 
durable consumer goods sector (i.e. automotive) dynamics.  
 
Of particular relevance for understanding the innovative dynamics in industries such as robotics, 
is the observation that the interactions between producers and external sources are valuable for 
directing the innovative process. For instance, in the case of the manufacture of electronic sub-
assembly process equipment, Von Hippel (1977) notes several cases where the innovative activity 
is a collaborative work involving the manufacturer and the user. The literature underscores the 
importance of maintaining a diversified knowledge base in these industries as demonstrated in 
Brusoni, Prencipe, and Pavitt’s (2001) investigation of multi-technology product manufacturers. 
Following Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy, the literature identifies these organizations as ‘specialized 
suppliers’ whose competitive advantage is built on a thorough understanding of users’ needs. 
Pavitt (1984) adds that these manufacturers’ innovations are often biased towards performance 
improvements such as better product design and reliability.  
 
Again, drawing parallels with the evolutionary approach, these studies suggest that most user-
producer interactions serve to stabilize the direction of technological development. As user-
producer relationships strengthen, the innovative output increasingly becomes centered on a 
limited set of identifiable problems which need to be addressed (Rosenberg, 1976; Klevorick et 
al., 1995) which results in a ‘natural trajectory’ (Nelson & Winter, 1982). In that case, the industry 
risks being locked into a specific path through various self-reinforcing effects (Fagerberg, 2006). 
As relationships and dynamics stabilize, a ‘dynamic inertia’ can emerge which results in 
indifference toward new technical opportunities and user needs (Lundvall, 1985). 
 
3. Methodology 
We employ a qualitative case study approach using quantitative data to understand the 
development of the knowledge bases of KUKA and COMAU, the two leading European robotics 
firms. The cases were constructed by gathering data from patents, company reports, news archives 
and (in the case of COMAU) interviews. Patent data are used to trace the evolution of these 
companies’ technological competences over 30 years from the mid 1980s to the mid 2010s. 
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To provide some background and identify the main characteristics and turning points in the 
evolution of these firms’ knowledge bases, we provide a brief history of the robotics sector which 
informs our expectations related to the case analysis. This historical background is based on the 
data gathered from news archives, journal articles, industry reports, and intergovernmental 
analyses. For each decade, we present the salient market and technological developments.  
 
Our focus on Europe is based on three main reasons. First, the presence of both industry-
recognized robotics companies and dynamic national markets. The top Asian robotics producers 
are concentrated in Japan with some of Asia’s largest markets (i.e. China, South Korea) hosting 
no sector-recognized robotics producers. Second, the availability of comparable cross-country 
patent data (from the European Patent Office - EPO). Three, the limited language constraints.2 We 
applied similar selection criteria to our choice of the firm cases:  they are industry-recognized ‘top 
firms’ and are headquartered in the largest European markets. Since the two largest robotics 
demand bases in Europe are in Germany and Italy (Estolatan et al., 2018), the research focuses on 
the German robotics producer KUKA AG, and the Italian COMAU SpA.3  
 
Use of patent data is a long tradition in innovation studies such as those that examine inter- and 
intra-industry differences in innovation behavior (Scherer, 1965, Achilladelis, Schwarskopf, & 
Cines, 1990), or knowledge spillovers (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993) across time (Jaffe 
& Trajtenberg, 1996, 1998) and regions (Maurseth & Verspagen, 2002). Despite some concerns4 
about the information provided in patents and its use, patents are used for economic research 
because they are ‘better’ than traditional measures for understanding inventive activity in the 
economy (Griliches, 1998). In particular, this research builds on a nascent sub-set of studies which 
rely on patent data to understand firms and their individual knowledge bases and knowledge 
                                                 
2 Use only of EPO data provides consistency, reliability, and comparability across firms (Griliches, 1998). Also, the literature 
highlights the stability of EPO data over time and across countries (van Zeebroeck, van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, & Han, 2006). 
Finally, while patent citations are susceptible to patent examiners’ influence during the application process, previous work shows 
that European examiners are more stringent than their US American counterparts over their additions  (Alcacer & Gittleman, 2006). 
3 While there are other more prominent and larger producers in Europe than COMAU, they are either headquartered in countries 
with no robust demand (i.e. Swiss firm Stäubli Holding AG), or are significantly involved in other lines of businesses (i.e. 
Swiss/Swedish ABB Group and its electrical systems production). 
4 See Griliches (1998) for a summary of patent-related issues. More recent critiques of patents are provided in Duguet and 
MacGarvie (2005) (inability of patents to characterize the learning process through imitation and reverse engineering) and Roach 
and Cohen (2013) (importance of patents for firms’ strategic behavior). There are some concerns also about the patent application 
process, see Alcacer and Gittelman (2006) on examiner bias and Jaffe et al. (2000) on patents as a ‘noisy’ measure of knowledge 
spillovers.   
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accumulation.5 Operationally, this means that patent data are interpreted as signals and traces of 
the firm’s knowledge base and technological competencies. We believe that this makes our 
investigation less affected by the known limitations related to patent-based research. 
 
We characterize firms’ innovative behavior as follows: 1) technological diversification, 2) 
technological competencies, and 3) local-distant search tendencies. Table 4 presents these 
measures and their calculation. Technological diversification is a measure of the enterprise’s range 
of technological capabilities. An index value close to 1 suggests that the firm exploits a wide range 
of technologies while a value of zero implies a focus on one specific technology. Following Patel 
and Pavitt (1997) we build a technological competencies matrix which combines revealed 
technology advantage (RTA) and patent share (PS) relative to the firm’s overall patent portfolio 
estimations.6 Last, we conduct a comparative analysis of the inclination for either external or 
internal search (which we treat as proxies for the firm’s exploration and exploitation behaviors). 
We estimate them based on year-by-year comparison of the firm’s institutional memory based on 
its patent stock during the previous five years, for any given year or stock-year (Rosenkopf & 
Nerkar, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002).  
 
Each index value is determined using a composite stock-year, aggregated from available data at 
the individual year level, such that each stock year is the total stock of knowledge during the 
previous five years. For instance, stock-year 1991 is the sum for the period 1987 to 1991. This 
approach reduces statistical noise and allows us to operationalize: 1) the cumulativeness of 
organizational knowledge, 2) the depreciation of knowledge (Argote, 2013), and 3) the bias 
towards recent knowledge based on organizational memory and individuals’ memories (Alcacer 
& Gittleman, 2006). Accordiing to Katila and Ahuja (2002), other yearly aggregations yield 
significantly similar results. We construct a stock-year for each year from 1991 to 2015. 
 
                                                 
5 Some examples in this tradition include Duguet and MacGarvie’s (2005) use of patents and Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
data in proving that patents parallel how knowledge flows in the organization, Stuart and Podolny’s (1996) patent-based inquiry 
into Mitsubishi’s rise in the Japanese semiconductor industry, Rosenkopf and Nerkar’s (2001) citations- and IPC-based 
investigation of the various levels of firm exploration strategies in the optical disk industry, and Katila and Ahuja’s (2002) study 
of firms’ search behaviors in the robotics and chemicals sectors based on a combination of firms’ patent citations, non-patent 
references, and product portfolios. 
6 A more detailed discussion regarding Patel & Pavitt’s methodology is available in Appendix A. 
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The selected sample of patents for the analysis are patents granted by the EPO between 1987 and 
2015. The data come primarily from Clarivate Analytics’ Derwent Innovation database and are 
confirmed by comparable data from Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) Amadeus database. We constructed 
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity based on company reports and news archives to validate 
the patent data collected. This yielded patent counts of 355 for COMAU and 1,132 for KUKA. 
We extracted bibliometric information commonly used in the literature: e.g. number of IPC 
subclasses, both application and publication years, patent citations, and cited patents’ first 
assignees. The patent count for COMAU is rather low (355), and thus, underrepresent the firm’s 
total knowledge base. We show that this likely stems from COMAU’s role as a subsidiary of the 
larger Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) Group whose R&D output is conducted in centralized 
laboratories. However, we believe that the sample represents the core technological knowledge of 
COMAU.  
 
The quantitative patent analysis is complemented by a qualitative analysis of the evolution of the 
companies’ activities during the same period. Financial, supplementary company information and 
M&A-related data are from the Amadeus database. Firms’ annual reports, available online for the 
last 15 years or so7 were analyzed to understand the firms’ strategic decisions. Finally, we 
conducted a detailed analysis of professional news articles.  
 
                                                 
7 In particular, FCA’s 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2013, 2014, and 2015 Annual Reports and KUKA AG’s 2001, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 Annual Reports are the primary sources of the supplementary data. 
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Table 4. Summary of patent data-based measures used in the research8 
Name of 










𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is ratio of patents 
in technical field 𝑖𝑖. 
4-level IPC 
subclass 
Derived from the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, equals zero if the firm works only on 
one technology and approximates unity if the firm’s research activity covers a wide 







𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 is IPC subclass’ 
share in the firm’s 
total IPC subclasses 




IPC subclasses are classified as core, niche, background, or marginal competencies 
which are defined as follows: core are distinctive technical competencies, niche are 
distinctive but relatively small technological fields, background are competencies to 
which the firm allocates significant resources but does not achieve relatively high 
advantage due to the size of the field, and marginal are activities to which the firm neither 
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patents of firm 𝑖𝑖 that 
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Data constraints dictated reliance on OECD data on all patent applications to the EPO 

















𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is citations 
made in 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  
but not in 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−1 ; 
𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is firms’ citation 
stock; 
𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is self-citations. 
Patent 
citations 
Firm citation stock is calculated as: 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
=  𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖                                                                        
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−1 + ⋯+ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−4 
 
                                                 
8 See Appendix A for a more extensive documentation of the methodology. 
9 The OECD uses a fractional count approach to distinguish patent applications by inventors of different nationalities; identifying patent ‘nationality’ allows a better approximation 
of countries’ patent contributions. Although it is likely to differ from a straight count of EPO data, the effect is unlikely to affect our research since the focus of the analysis is on 
understanding the evolution of firm capabilities over time, and not absolute RTA values. 
 
4. The contemporary robotics industry and its evolution since the early-1970s 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE), through the 2012 ISO-Standard 8373, loosely defines a robot 
as a reprogrammable, multifunctional manipulator designed to move material, parts, tools or 
specialized devices through variable programmed motions for the performance of a variety of 
tasks, which also acquire information from the environment and move intelligently in response. 
The International Federation of Robotics (IFR), the sector’s main special-interest organization, 
and other national industry associations such as the US Robotics Industries Association (RIA) and 
the UK British Automation & Robot Association (BARA), have adopted similar definitions 
(BARA, 2017; IFR, 2017a; RIA, 2017). 
 
Robots promise cost-efficiency and greater accuracy and reliability relative to human agents (ABB 
Group, 2016; PwC, 2017). They are able to perform tasks that are highly dangerous (i.e. nuclear 
power plant decontamination), repetitive, stressful, labor-intensive (i.e. welding), or menial for 
human agents. Currently, the IFR and the industry at large adhere to two classifications of robots: 
industrial robots (IRs) and service robots (SRs) (IFR, 2016a). An IR is an automatically controlled, 
reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator programmable in three or more axes which can be 
either fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial automation applications (IFR, 2016b). A SR is 
a robot that performs useful tasks for humans or equipment excluding industrial automation 
applications (ISO 8373, 2012). As mentioned above, most of the succeeding sections focus on IRs 
because they represent (until recently) the core of the industry and are the building blocks of digital 
manufacturing. 
 
Various recent but related developments in hardware and software technologies, academic 
research, and the industry itself have enabled sustained expansion of nascent sub-sectors, 
particularly those related to the digitization of production. Most prominent among these next-
generation robots are interactive robots. These are expected to be viable in environments in which 
various forms of interactions with human agents take place, and are intuitive, easy-to-use, and 
responsive to user needs (Christensen et al., 2016). These next-generation robots promise human-
machine cooperation beyond collision avoidance (Kruger, et. al., 2009), such that the flexibility 
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and adaptability of human agents in complex tasks, and the consistency and productivity of 
machines in automated tasks can be achieved simultaneously in production (Michalos et. al., 
2010).  
 
In production in particular, the main anticipated sub-class of interactive robots is collaborative 
robots or co-bots. They were invented by Northwestern University McCormick School of 
Engineering professor Edward Colgate (with Michael Peshkin), and are mechanical devices which 
provide guidance through the use of servomotors with a human operator providing motive power 
(Krüger et al., 2009; Morris, 2016). In practice, what distinguishes a co-bot is its ability to provide 
direct power support to a human agent in a strenuous task while maintaining a high level of 
mobility (Lau, 2005). Although co-bots are employed mostly in manufacturing tasks, they are 
viable also for non-traditional applications such a surgery (Delnondedieu and Troccaz, 1996). 
 
4.1 A brief account of the evolution of the robotics industry 
Roboticists date the emergence of the contemporary robotics landscape to mid-1950 to 1960 when 
Joseph Engelberger, of Consolidated Controls, together with the inventor Joseph Devol, launched 
the Unimate robot as a novel approach to automating production (Robotics Industry Association, 
2018). Through Engelberger’s efforts, in 1961 the Unimate robot was commercially applied in a 
General Motors (GM) assembly line in Trenton, NJ. Two years later, around 450 robots were being 
used in die casting activity across the carmakers’ plant (Robotics Industry Association, 2018). 
However, technology adoption was slow, and Engelberger (1985) acknowledges that his company 
did not profit from it until 1975 because potential clients found it difficult at the time to find 
economic justification for installing robots (despite a clear value proposition and popular support). 
Engelberger attributed this primarily to the observation that manufacturing tends to be an 
inherently conservative activity in which institutional norms (including skepticism towards new 
technology and a preference for cheap human labor) are likely to prevail. It was not until strong 
labor unions and increased worker militancy in the US (Greenhouse, 1998) and Europe ca. 1970s 
(Tagliabue, 1982) which introduced innovative employee benefits (such as employer-financed 
pensions and cost of living adjustments), that car companies began increasingly to consider 
adoption of more automated modes of production. 
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At the same time of Unimate’s first commercialization, much of the research was conducted in 
various university research laboratories such as Stanford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), and Carnegie Melon University (CMU) (Kurfess, 2005). As Kurfess (2005) pointed out, 
most of these activities sought to improve machine intelligence and enable robots to respond in 
unstructured settings. Most prominent among these endeavors was Stanford student Victor 
Scheiman’s 1969 Stanford arm, the first six-axis robot which demonstrated assembly capabilities 
thereby expanding potential robot applications (Corday, 2014).  
 
The following decade witnessed the geographical spread of robotics beyond the US, as 
Engelberger introduced robotics to partners in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe (through Nokia, 
Finland) and Japan (through Kawasaki Heavy Industries) (Robotics Industry Association, 2018). 
Engelberger (1985) notes that the Japanese firms could be regarded as the catalyst for the broader 
adoption of robotics in manufacturing. He describes Japanese companies as enthusiastic about 
exploring the potential of the technology and being eager to apply the machines in their assembly 
lines. Comparable developments in the use of robotics in industrial applications were continuing 
also throughout Western Europe, by different organizations (our case companies).  
 
In the 1970s and the 1980s material handling was a main area of application for robotics (Wallén, 
2008).  Wallén (2008) notes also that arc welding and assembly activities were emerging areas of 
application at that time, but both required better motor and control systems. Among the main user 
industries, Wallén (2008) observed that the automotive industry was the most valuable client ca. 
1970s, with the metal sector another significant user.  
 
Despite steady growth, employment of robots remained limited because of the substantial costs 
and inherent limitations of ‘hard automation’ technologies which require round the clock 
operations (Ayres & Miller, 1981). In the 1970s and 1980s, US manufacturing was predominantly 
batch activity meaning that production lines ran for extended hours or days. Prospective clients 
involved in batch-producing industries had concerns about the likely underutilization of the 
machines on the shop floor and any cost savings being mitigated by under-capacity (Carter, 1985).  
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The 1980s and the 1990s saw the steady expansion of robotics use in various industries, although 
the automotive industry remained the most significant – with GM the leading robotics purchaser 
at the firm level (Miller, 1989). The other major users of robots included home appliances, 
consumer goods, electronics, and off-road vehicles. Miller (1989) notes that there was substantial 
interest from the aerospace sector at the time, but most robotics projects were exploratory. By the 
late 1980s, there were industrial producers in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Sweden (Porter, 2011).  
 
UNECE and IFR (1996, 1999) reports suggest that the 1990s saw relatively uneven growth of the 
industry. Global sales of robots decreased between 1991 and 1993, recovered up to 1997 and then 
declined in 1998. Major markets such as the US, Europe, and East Asia saw notable fluctuations 
in demand across the years, due to the economic crises during the 1990s. Throughout, the 
automotive industry continued to be the largest customer. Other significant robot application 
sectors at that time included off-road vehicles, electronics, food, pharmaceuticals, appliances, 
aerospace, and metal fabrication (UN-IFR, 1996). The latter half of the 1990s saw exploratory 
activities related to the transformation of IRs for service applications. Industry analysts attribute 
the viability of SRs primarily to the falling costs and increasing capabilities of the machines (UN-
IFR, 1999). 
 
Technology-wise, Engelberger (1985) noted that the commercially available robotics technology 
in 1985 was not markedly different from that available 20 years earlier. He points out that much 
of the expected improvements at the time could logically have been expected such as developments 
in vision and sense technologies. Later assessments echo Engelberger’s views (UN-IFR, 2002). 
For instance, half of all operating robotics machines were used in welding activities – a distribution 
which had been stable for several years – and the second-largest application area was materials 
handling activities. Even more recent industry scanning suggests that contemporary robotics 
technology remains comparable to that available in the 1980s especially in its 
mechanical/hardware aspects (Estolatan et al., 2018).  
 
Table 1 is based on IFR operational stock data for the period 1993 to 2015 and shows that demand 
distribution remained heavily concentrated, particularly in the four industries of automotive (38%), 
electrical/electronics (24%), metalworking (13%), and plastic and chemicals (13%). The fifth-
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largest, the catch-all category of all other manufacturing activities has an average share of only 
around 6% throughout the specified time frame. Demand did not pick up substantially in other 
industries. 
 
Table 1. World robotics operational stock 1993 – 2015 share averages, by manufacturing sub-
sector 
Industry Total Ave SD 93 - '00 Ave SD 01 - '10 Ave SD 11 - '15  Ave SD 
Food and beverages 2.15 1.01 1.13 0.12 2.13 0.58 3.52 0.18 
Textiles 0.20 0.08 0.29 0.01 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.01 
Wood and furniture 1.13 1.23 2.21 1.69 0.76 0.16 0.31 0.03 
Paper 0.33 0.05 0.34 0.03 0.36 0.03 0.28 0.03 
Plastic and chemicals 12.67 1.08 12.69 0.69 13.46 0.56 11.52 0.67 
Glass, ceramics, minerals 0.81 0.12 0.82 0.19 0.85 0.02 0.73 0.06 
Metal 13.07 2.06 15.55 1.57 12.10 0.69 11.35 0.19 
Electronics 23.92 4.69 29.73 1.81 20.03 1.95 22.03 1.17 
Automotive 38.35 7.36 29.13 1.37 41.71 4.30 45.41 0.41 
Other vehicles 1.47 0.87 2.48 0.36 1.21 0.55 0.57 0.01 
Others 5.91 2.52 5.63 3.22 7.22 2.00 4.17 0.33 
Source: IFR (2018) 
 
As expected, the automotive sector has the highest demand for robots. In the period 1993 to 2000, 
automotive accounted for an average share of around 30%, and since then, carmakers have 
represented between 40% and 45% of demand. In contrast to the growing popularity of robots 
among carmakers, the electronics industry (the other major robots market) experienced a boom in 
demand during the 1990s (average 30%) which levelled out at the beginning of the 21st century to 
an average of around 21%. Year-on-year (YOY) analysis of the operational stock data (see Table 
2) supports these increasing trends. Table 2 suggests also that there is steady annual growth in 
other applications such as food and beverages (both overall YOY and by-decade YOY calculations 
are indicative of increasing adoption). However, the broader trend hints at the persisting issues 
related to application on non-traditional areas. Apart from the food and beverage sector, all other 
sectors except the four previously identified show negative growth along our time frame. Positive 






Table 2. World robotics operational stock 1993 – 2015 year-on-year (YOY) share averages, by 
manufacturing sub-sector 
Industry Total Ave SD 93 - '00 Ave SD 01 - '10 Ave SD 11 - '15  Ave SD 
Food and beverages 5.92 7.16 4.31 11.75 9.23 2.68 2.95 2.03 
Textiles -3.67 6.34 0.06 5.79 -8.36 3.65 -0.05 6.59 
Wood and furniture -7.32 18.54 -6.66 33.98 -6.86 4.79 -10.47 9.05 
Paper -1.03 4.61 2.76 5.25 -1.48 3.31 -4.59 2.29 
Plastic and chemicals -0.93 3.93 1.17 4.07 -0.35 3.66 -4.13 1.87 
Glass, ceramics, minerals -1.33 9.79 -2.55 16.99 1.24 4.86 -5.13 1.72 
Metal -1.66 3.40 -3.89 2.61 -0.67 3.91 -0.70 2.54 
Electronics -0.81 5.07 -2.47 1.06 -3.41 4.59 4.68 2.75 
Automotive 1.97 2.96 1.78 1.40 3.89 2.98 -0.53 1.09 
Other vehicles -5.16 10.37 2.57 13.35 -12.04 5.87 -2.15 3.61 
Others 9.36 53.84 41.66 93.57 -6.53 7.86 -2.59 4.57 
Source: IFR (2018)  
 
Focusing on IFR delivered robots (robot sales) during the same period (see Table 3), we see 
increasing adoption of robotics in industrial applications but at a constant rate of growth which 
shows a doubling every 10 years or so. The data show also the drastic drop in demand for robots 
post-crises: demand decreased noticeably in years 1998 and 2009 following the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and the 2008 financial crisis. In 1993, robots for use in manufacturing had an 18% 
share of total sales while those for general-purpose applications (apart from traditional agricultural 
and service applications) achieved an 82% share. By 2015, these trends had reversed – robots for 
manufacturing represented a 91% share and general-purpose robots an 8% share.  
 
Table 3. World robotics delivered robots 1993 – 2015, by select years in select industries 
Industry 1993 1995 1997 1998 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2015 
Manufacturing  9,564   14,706   60,638   53,843   74,860   101,000   94,213   49,162   99,268   231,502  
Unspecified applications  43,724   54,507   19,873   14,331   23,184   18,542   18,158   9,938   20,088   20,007  
All Industries  53,409   69,260   81,675   69,025   98,667   120,100   112,972   60,018   120,585   253,748  
Source: IFR (2018)  
 
Table 4 summarizes developments in the robotics industry. Overall, its history presents a picture 
of a high-technology sector struggling constantly to maintain market stability (particularly in terms 
of its relationship to mostly conservative manufacturing sector markets) and to introduce sectoral 
dynamism (by introducing new robot-related technologies intended to lead to new products and 
new market opportunities). We observe several examples of diversification efforts and many 
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instances of failed experimental initiatives aimed at changing the value proposition in a sector and 
relationships to target markets. 
 
Table 4. Salient developments in the robotics industry 
Period Development 
1950-1959 Joseph Engelberger & Joseph Devol launch the Unimate robot as a production automation solution. 
1960-1969 Unimate robots start to be integrated in General Motors' assembly lines; various universities (i.e. Stanford, MIT) continue to research robotics technologies. 




Robots are being used increasingly in other industries (such as home appliances, consumer 
goods, electronics, off-road vehicles), although carmakers remain the main market; industrial 
robot producers are established in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Sweden. 
1990-1999 Robotics industry experiences uneven growth although it maintains high exposure in the automotive sector; experiments in service applications begin.  
2000-2009 Robots remain in demand by the car making sector and increasingly the electronics sector; robot use in non-traditional applications continues to be difficult. 
 
Nevertheless, we think that recent big data, data storage, computational capacity, and algorithm 
developments are accelerating advances in artificial intelligence and promise radical changes to 
sector dynamics. The second part of the 2010s has seen daily announcements of new futuristic 
fully interactive robots produced by technological startups and successful development of 
interactive robots (particularly co-bots). These have been introduced in manufacturing and are 
allowing more extensive human-robot collaboration which should lead in turn to productivity 
increases (Shah et al., 2011). Early adopters - mostly car manufacturers – have already realized 
gains (Nisen, 2014; Luxton, 2016; Zalecki, 2016). These next-generation robots are expected to 
be a significant driver of industry growth in the future (Lawton, 2016a; Universal Robots, 2016) 
depending on whether their diffusion is accompanied by a radical reorganization of the factory.  
 
We think that this sudden influx of new technologies in highly complementary industries will lead 
the industry and its enterprises to increase their technological diversification (allowing it to better 
realize the more sophisticated robotics products), and expand their innovation strategies (since 
these new technologies require that they access other companies with expertise in these emergent 
digital technologies). Thus, we expect significant changes to firm behavior and associated changes 




5. Accumulation of technological knowledge: the cases of COMAU and KUKA  
To examine the case firms’ knowledge accumulation in terms of diversification and specialization 
of technological knowledge over time, we split our analysis into two parts. Each case study begins 
with archival analyses of company reports, news archives, and financial databases, and 
identification of organizational milestones. Next, we discuss the set of derived patent-based 
measures for each firm, emphasizing structural breaks and shifts in trends in relationship to these 
firms’ historical evolution. Similarities and differences in knowledge bases and accumulation 
strategies are investigated in detail by analyzing the firms’ broader socio-economic environment.  
 
5.1 COMAU SpA 
COMAU, derived from the acronym COnsorzio MAcchine Utensili (consortium of machine tools), 
was established in 1973 by Torino-based engineers who had been involved in building the Russian 
Volga Automobile plant. The company was first partly and then fully owed by FIAT, it was 
engaged in producing industrial automation and advanced manufacturing systems. COMAU was 
instrumental in helping FIAT transform its manufacturing sites into automated factories through 
the development and introduction of its highly-flexible Robogate systems (Camuffo & Volpato, 
1996). In the 1980s, COMAU leveraged this expertise to enter the North American market 
(through its affiliate Comau Productivity Systems) and to work with German mechanical 
engineering TRUMPF Group on the development of laser robots. From the 1990s to 2000, 
COMAU expanded beyond servicing FIAT’s plants and its North American partners (mainly, 
General Motors at the time), and established a presence in other European countries, South 
America, and Asia. It worked on the development of automation solutions and equipment 
maintenance services for related industries such as aerospace, heavy vehicles, railways, and 
renewable energy. Some notable acquisitions made by COMAU in that period include Renault 
Automation France, GermanINTEC GmbH, and the North American bodywork systems 
manufacturer Progressive Tool and Industries Co. (PICO). At the beginning of the 21st century, 
COMAU was a high-technology enterprise which offered an integrated value proposition (from 
automation solutions to aftermarket maintenance) to its customers. Unlike other robotics 




Table 5. COMAU SpA financial highlights 2008 - 2015, in thousands EUR 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Current assets  NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Total assets (TA)  NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Non-current liabilities  NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Current liabilities  NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Total liabilities (TL)  NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Operating revenue  1,123,000   728,000   1,023,000   1,402,000   1,482,000   1,463,000   1,550,000   1,952,000   1,340,375  
Period P/L (Net income) / EBIT  NA   (32,000)  (6,000)  (120,000)  33,000   47,000   60,000*   72,000*   (15,600) 
No. of employees  11,445   11,708   12,216   14,457   NA   NA   NA   ~9,000**   NA  
Current (working capital) ratio  NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  
TL/TA ratio  NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  
Source: Amadeus database (2018) 
Notes: R&D expenses includes capitalized R&D and R&D charged directly to income statement.  
*EBIT Report was adjusted in 2013 to reflect subsidiary’s adjusted EBIT.  
** Estimated employees’ number from recent annual reports 
 
Company documents suggest that COMAU experienced some difficulties in the 2000s. In 2004, 
the firm conducted some minor restructuring which resulted in its Mirafiori capabilities (i.e. 
service and die) being transferred to the parent FIAT Auto and FIAT-GM power train, and a 
significant part of its total servicing and maintenance operations distributed to sister companies 
such as IVECO, Magneti Marelli, and CNH. By the third-quarter of 2006, the FIAT Group had 
imposed on COMAU a significant restructuring program. This took approximately two years and 
resulted in down-sizing and divestments (particularly, COMAU France’s engineering business, 
COMAU’s South African businesses, and COMAU subsidiary GermanINTEC, and the transfer of 
Turin’s engineering division to the affiliated Elasis Group). At the same time, FIAT consolidated 
its research efforts into two non-COMAU subsidiaries: 1) Centro Ricerche FIAT (Piemonte) and 
2) Elasis (Southern Italy) in 2007. In 2008 when FIAT and Chrysler merged into the FIAT Chrysler 
Automobiles (FCA) Group, COMAU increased its exposure to the Group’s companies. It took on 
responsibility for modernizing the Group’s (particularly Chrysler’s) operations. A significant 
proportion (25%-30%) of COMAU’s sales are made by the Group’s companies. Currently, 
COMAU is involved mainly in powertrain metal cutting systems, mechanical assembly systems 
and testing, innovative and high-performance body welding, and assembly systems and robotics.  
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The most recent (although limited) financial statistics10 for 2008 to 2015 (see Table 5) provide 
evidence of the firm’s restructuring. The first half of the seven-year period is characterized by 
negative net income. Only in 2012 did COMAU begin to reap the benefits of its strategy and 
become profitable. Employee numbers in the first half of the period were around 12,000 on 
average; by 2018 COMAU had around 9,000 employees spread across 17 different countries. 
Table 6 summarizes COMAU’s main developments. 
 
Table 6. COMAU SpA salient developments throughout its organizational history 
 
Period Development Key collaborators Key acquisitions Key divestments 
1973 COMAU is established 
by Torino-based 
engineers as an 
automation systems 
provider for the FIAT 
Group. 
FIAT Group NA NA 
1980s COMAU begins 
development of advanced 
robotics (i.e. laser 
robots); COMAU enters 
the North American 
market. 
FIAT Group; TRUMPF 
Group NA NA 
1990s COMAU leverages its 
capabilities in other 
industries (i.e. aerospace, 
heavy vehicles, etc.); 
COMAU expands and 
entes markets in other 
European, South 





GmbH; Progressive Tool 
and Industries Co. 
NA 
2004 COMAU undergoes a 
corporate restructuring. FIAT Group NA 
Service & die 
capabilities; servicing & 
maintenance operations 
2006 (Q3) 
COMAU undergoes a 
significant corporate 
restructuring. 
FIAT Group NA 
COMAU France; 
COMAU South Africa; 
germanINTEC; COMAU 
Italia's Turin engineering 
division 
2007 FIAT consolidates its 
R&D efforts across its 
subsidiaries. 
FIAT Group NA COMAU's several R&D units 
2008 COMAU increases its 
exposure to the FIAT 







COMAU’s combination of patent-based measures are aligned to the above developments. Our 
analysis suggests that: a) the firm maintained its high technological diversification from 1991 to 
2015 (see Figure 1), b) there was a marked reduction and shift in its technology mix around the 
                                                 
10 More detailed financial data are available for COMAU’s operations in Italy during the same period. See Appendix B for the 
reference.   
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mid-2000s (see Figure 2), and c) there was a behavioral shift in its local knowledge vs. distant 
knowledge search around the mid-2000s (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 1. COMAU SpA and KUKA AG diversification measures, stock-years 1991 – 2015 
 
 
COMAU’s technological profile in the period 1991 to 2015 went through significant changes 
although some of its core competences remained unaltered (see Figure 2). On average, among the 
firm’s 73% of technologies that can be classified according to the Patel-Pavitt matrix, 28% are 
core technologies, 7% are niche, 14% are background, and 25% are marginal technologies. The 
‘technology mix’ shift shows substantial reductions in marginal and background technologies and 
a notable consistency in core capabilities in metal forming machinery and machine tools (B23K 
& B25J) and motor vehicles (B62D). In addition, we observe capacity-building in computing and 
electronics manufacture particularly in measuring instruments (G05B), and evolution from a 




































































Robotics firms' knowledge stock diversification 








IPC Subclass Economic activity IPC Subclass Economic activity 
G05B instruments and appliances for measuring B23K 
fabricated metal products, except 
machinery 
B21D, B23Q 
metal forming machinery & 
machine tools; machinery & 
equipment 
B25J 
metal forming machinery & 
machine tools; machinery & 
equipment 
G01B computer, electronic, and optical products B62D motor vehicles 
    
    








IPC Subclass Economic activity IPC Subclass Economic activity 
B30B fabricated metal products, except machinery 
  
G01D instruments and appliances for measuring 
  
B60J motor vehicles   
C09J other chemical products   
B65G other general purpose machinery   
H02G wiring and wiring devices   
E04H specialized construction activities  
 







IPC Subclass Economic activity IPC Subclass Economic activity 
B65G machinery & equipment G05B instruments and appliances for measuring 
  B23K, B23P, B25J metal forming machinery and machine tools 
  B62D motor vehicles 
  B62B Other manufacturing 
Marginal Niche 
IPC Subclass Economic activity IPC Subclass Economic activity 
F16H general purpose machinery B21D, B21J metal forming machinery and machine tools 
B23Q metal forming machinery and machine tools B05C other special purpose machinery 
B05B other general purpose machinery   
E04H specialized construction activities 
  
    
For the mapping from IPC sub-classes to NACE activities, we follow Van Looy, et. al’s (2014) concordance table. 
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Regarding the local-distant knowledge search (see Figure 3), COMAU’s behavior over 25 years is 
market by notable shifts and a few trends. Overall search tendency is relatively consistent, with 
roughly a quarter of new knowledge added to the total knowledge base on average. Interestingly, 
there was a marked shift around the mid-2000s when COMAU substantially increased its self-
citation intensity; self-citation behavior began to decrease by 2011.  
 
Figure 3. COMAU SpA search scope and self-citation measures, stock-years 1991 – 2015 
 
 
5.2 KUKA AG 
KUKA started when Johann Josef Keller and Jakob Knappich founded "Acetylenwerk für 
Beleuchtungen in Augsburg" back in 1898. KUKA is derived from the abbreviation the founders 
often used in their telegrams i.e. the initial letters of “Keller und Knappich Augsburg.” The 120-
year old initially was a producer of lighting for Augsburg households and streets but soon 
expanded into welding-related activities including welding technologies and related activities such 
as cutting. It accumulated competencies to enable industrial-scale production, particularly for 
municipal vehicles and consumer appliance manufacturing. It also developed capabilities in 
industrial automation.  
 
Industrial automation capabilities have become an increasingly important part of KUKA’s core 


































































In addition, the new enterprise entered the areas of packaging machinery, textile engineering, 
control technology, metal forming, and machine tools. By the 1980s, the former KUKA became 
IWKA and transformed into a holding company for various (loosely) interrelated businesses 
focused on environmental, welding, and defense technologies. The succeeding years saw KUKA 
(IWKA AG at this time) continue to develop its competencies and market expansion (particularly 
in North America). The most important acquisitions during that period were KUKA’s acquisitions 
in 1999 of the German technology enterprise Rheinmetal Group and the Anglo-American BWI 
Group. This strengthened the firms packaging capabilities. At the start of the 21st century, KUKA 
was a broad-based technology group involved primarily in production (welding), manufacturing 
(automation), process (controls and measurement), and packaging technologies for an extensive 
set of industries.  
 
Apart from this, KUKA has invested continuously in robotics-related technologies over the years. 
It was responsible for the installation of robotic welding transfer lines in Daimler-Benz’s plants in 
1971. In 1973, KUKA introduced FAMULUS, claiming that it was the first industrial robot with 
six electromechanically driven axes. In the 1990s, KUKA embarked on the introduction of open-
source control mechanisms for its automated machines. Throughout this period, robotics continued 
to be important for the firm’s development. 
 
KUKA’s annual reports indicate that operational risks and an unfavorable economic climate 
triggered the firm restructuring in the mid-2000s. As early as 2000, KUKA had begun to sell 
defense-related technologies. In 2004, it began an extensive divestment process which involved 
the sale of its non-core businesses and process technologies. Over the next three years, KUKA 
continued to make further divestments including severance with the machining providers EX-
CELL-O Group and the Boehringer Group, and the standard machine tools producer GSN 
Maschinen-Anlagen-Service GmbH (KUKA AG, 2006). It completed its divestments by severing 
its ties to the Bopp & Reuther-affiliated VAG-Armaturen GmbH (KUKA AG, 2004) and the RMG 
group (natural gas distribution measurement activities) (KUKA AG, 2005). In 2007, KUKA sold 
off all of its companies involved primarily in packaging technologies (KUKA AG, 2007). KUKA’s 
employment dropped from nearly 12,000 in 1999 to just over 5,000 in 2007. However, in this 
period KUKA refocused on robotics and production systems. When it was reborn from IWKA AG 
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to KUKA AG once more, the company had only two business segments: robotics and automation 
systems. This distinction among is operations remained stable to 2013. Robotics became a central 
component in KUKA’s business strategy after (and even during) its restructuring.11 The 
company’s intent was to deepen and leverage its robotics expertise to apply a more diverse set of 
non-automotive industries including plastics processing, logistics, medical technologies, and food 
and food processing. The change in its executive management in 2009 increased the focus on these 
goals and resulted in more aggressive marketing of robotics for potential non-automotive 
applications (McGee, 2017).  
 
Table 7. KUKA AG financial highlights 2008 - 2015, in thousands EUR 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  Average  
Current assets  697,850   555,789   821,470   911,400   959,400   1,150,800   1,309,100   1,689,200   1,011,876  
Total assets (TA)  865,478   726,221   984,738   1,078,000   1,137,400   1,377,100   1,979,500   2,381,700   1,316,267  
Non-current liabilities  274,812   293,113   398,188   380,800   405,900   502,500   517,200   631,600   425,514  
Current liabilities  377,132   272,283   388,465   444,800   434,000   495,500   921,200   1,017,600   543,873  
Total liabilities (TL)  651,944   565,396   786,653   825,600   839,900   998,000   1,438,400   1,649,200   969,387  
Operating revenue  1,294,215   927,119   1,108,847   1,478,600   1,771,000   1,806,000   2,105,500   2,988,900   1,685,023  
Period P/L (Net income)  30,552   (75,812)  (8,566)  29,900   55,600   58,300   68,100   86,300   30,547  
No. of employees  5,815   5,811   5,629   6,140   6,830   7,477   11,504   12,355   7,695  
R&D expenses  33,711   35,565   29,537   37,700   42,600   59,700   78,200   105,400   52,802  
Current (working capital) ratio  1.85   2.04   2.11   2.05   2.21   2.32   1.42   1.66   1.96  
TL/TA ratio  0.75   0.78   0.80   0.77   0.74   0.72   0.73   0.69   0.75  
Source: Amadeus database (2018) 
 
Some of its most significant post-restructuring robotics-focused milestones include establishment 
of the Advanced Robotics section (KUKA laboratories) within its robotics division and a foray 
into collaborative robots through its lightweight robot (LWR) developed in 2011. In the context of 
M&As, KUKA’s strategy was aimed at strengthening its core divisions. Its acquisitions (all 
completed in 2014) include Reis Group which extended KUKA Systems Division’s capabilities in 
the cell business for general sectors; Alema Automation SAS which gave KUKA Systems 
competencies in industrial automation for aircraft manufacture; and a stake in FAUDE 
Automatisierungstechnik GmbH a production and process automation provider specialized in 
human-robot collaboration. Its most important merger (in 2014) was with Swisslog Holding AG, 
a one hundred years old Swiss robotics company specialized in automation solutions for warehouse 
logistics (particularly the demand segments of e-commerce, pharmaceuticals, and temperature-
                                                 
11 2007 also saw the introduction of KUKA’s (and the world’s) largest and strongest IR, the KR Titan. 
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controlled foodstuffs) and healthcare. KUKA integrated Swisslog as a subsidiary, completing the 
process in 2015. Recent management discussion confirms KUKA’s ambition to leverage its 
robotics and industrial automation know-how to serve a range of industries, including automotive, 
aerospace, electronics, FMCG, metals, energy, healthcare, and e-commerce. KUKA’s more recent 
patent-based technological profile demonstrates the increased scope of the firm’s knowledge base 
and diversification into potential new robotics user industries (with different technological 
characteristics and requirements) such as warehouse automation and healthcare. 
 
Table 8. KUKA AG salient developments throughout its organizational history 
 
Period Development Key collaborators Key acquistions Key divestments 
1898 
KUKA is established by Johann 
Josef Keller and Jakob Knappich 
as an Ausburg lighting & 
welding company. 
NA NA NA 
1970s 
KUKA merges with Industrie-
Werke Karlsruhe AG to form 
IWKA AG as an industrial 
automation firm; KUKA 
develops FAMULUS, the first 
six-arm IR. 
Industrie-Werke 
Karlsruhe AG NA NA 
1980s 
KUKA (now IWKA AG) 
expands its operations to other 
industries (i.e. packaging 
machinery, textile engineering, 
control technology, metal 
forming, and machine tools). 
NA NA NA 
1990s 
IWKA AG becomes a holding 
company for interrelated 
businesses focused on 
environmental, welding, & 
defense technologies; IWKA AG 
expanded to international 
markets (i.e. North America). 
NA Rheinmetal Group; BWI Group NA 
2000 KUKA sells its defense-related technologies NA NA Rheinmetal Group 
2004-2006 KUKA sells its interests in non-core business operations NA NA 
EX-CELL-O Group; 
Boehringer Group; GSN 
Maschinen-Anlagen-Service 
GmbH; Bopp & Reuther-
affiliated VAG-Armaturen 
GmbH; RMG Group 
2007 
KUKA re-establishes itself as 
KUKA AG; KUKA completes its 
divestment strategy and refocuses 
on its core competencies in 
robotics and production systems. 
NA NA Packaging technology unit 
2009 KUKA undergoes a change in its executive management. NA NA NA 
2014 
KUKA undergoes an aggressive 








Financial data for 2008 to 2015 (see Table 7) exhibit small but discernible traces of the KUKA 
restructuring process (much of which happened in the preceding years). The statistics highlight 
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also the periods of relative stability and succeeding abrupt change which KUKA experienced with 
the change in its executive management in 2009. The years 2008 and 2009 (and to a lesser extent 
2010) suggest an overall contraction of the firm (reductions in R&D expenses and employee counts 
persisted until 2010). Thereafter, organizational growth remained minor; KUKA focused on 
reducing its losses and improving its liquidity. The effects of the management changes began to 
materialize around 2013, as significantly increased current assets, current liabilities, and R&D 
expenses and flat profitability growth. There were sizeable increases across all the metrics in the 
years that followed although the firm’s high liquidity and low leveraged character had begun to 
erode by 2014. In 2018, KUKA had around 14,000 employees spread across 39 different countries. 
Table 8 summarizes KUKA’s salient developments. 
 
Similar to COMAU, KUKA’s set of patent-based measures show shifts and breaks in line with the 
above narrative. Our analysis suggests that: a) the firm maintained its high technological 
diversification from 1991 to 2015 (see figure 1), b) experienced a marked reduction and shift in its 
technology mix in the mid-2000s (see figure 4), and c) experienced a behavioral shift in its local 
vs. distant knowledge search around the mid-2000s (figure 5). 
 




IPC Subclass Economic activity IPC Subclass Economic activity 
B25J metal forming machinery and machine tools B23K, B23P 
metal forming machinery and 
machine tools 
B62D motor vehicles F41A, F41F weapons and ammunition 
B08B other special purpose machinery   
    
    
    
    
Marginal Niche 
IPC Subclass Economic activity IPC Subclass Economic activity 
    
    
    
    





Our mapping of IPC sub-classes to NACE activities is in line with Van Looy’s (2014) concordance table. 
 
The selected technological profiles of KUKA from 1991 to 2015 (see figure 4) demonstrate the 
richness of its technical capabilities. Among the enterprise’s 66% technologies classifiable in the 
Patel-Pavitt matrix, 18% are core, 11% are niche, 14% are background, and 23% are marginal. 
The technology mix shift in the mid-2000s constituted an extensive change and involved 
substantial reductions in its background and core technologies. However, there was a marked 
increase in its marginal and niche technologies. KUKA built on its capacity in measurement and 
computing capabilities with measurement instruments and appliances (G05B) becoming a core 
competence. Finally, it can be seen how certain technologies became irrelevant to the company’s 
capabilities. In stock-year 1991, the company had technical strengths in fabricated metal 
production and military production. Over time, these capabilities lost their significance and finally 










IPC Subclass Economic activity IPC Subclass Economic activity 
A61B medical and dental instruments and supplies G05B 
instruments and appliances for 
measuring 
  B23K, B23J metal forming machinery and machine tools 
  B65G other general purpose machinery 
    
    
Marginal Niche 
IPC Subclass Economic activity IPC Subclass Economic activity 
F15B general purpose machinery G05D general purpose machinery 
G01C, G01D, G01L, G01R instruments and appliances for measuring B21D, B21J, B23P, B23Q 
metal forming machinery and 
machine tools 
G01T medical and dental instruments and supplies B61B other general purpose machinery 
B23B metal forming machinery and machine tools B05C, F16P other special purpose machinery 
B60J motor vehicles A63G Other manufacturing 
B66F other general purpose machinery   
B05D other special purpose machinery   
G09B Manufacturing N.E.C   
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In the context of the firm’s propensities for local or distant knowledge search (see figure 5), the 
analysis does not support the idea of exploitation and exploration as two ends of a continuum. 
Rather, KUKA employed both strategies when appropriate – from the early 2000s to the present 
there has been an increase in the scope of the external search coupled with relatively stable self-
citation behavior (10% of citations). This confirm that the diversification strategy related to M&As 
was aimed at achieving a strategic repositioning of the KUKA knowledge base in robotics areas 
distant from its traditional knowledge. 
 
Figure 5. KUKA AG search scope and self-citation measures, stock-years 1991 - 2015 
 
5.3 The mid-2000s restructuring among robotics firms: was this coincidental?  
The technological and behavioral shifts that occurred in COMAU and KUKA around the mid-
2000s require further investigation. Were they the result of internal deliberations or the products 
of an external shock? Looking into the evolution of the automotive sector, the long-standing 
primary market for automation, suggests that the crises and restructuring of the automobile 
industry had a major demand shock on the robotics sector. 
 
The state of the global automotive sector in the early 2000s depended mainly on robust demand 
from the Americas and Western Europe (which were already at a peak) since the Asian and other 
emerging markets were only beginning to emerge (UK House of Commons, 2004). Among these 
markets, the US was the most valuable and included some of the world’s largest car manufacturers 
and significant demand for vehicles. For robotics firms, the US was equally important because its 


































































industrial automation (FIAT Group, 2005; KUKA AG, 2004). While Western Europe was also 
valuable, the robotics market was already mature and had only modest room for growth (although 
at the time high levels of growth were expected in the new EU Eastern Europe countries) (KUKA 
AG, 2004). 
 
This sectoral dependence meant that the demand crunch which occurred in US car industry affected 
the robotics manufacturers. This crunch was due to several factors including over-production of 
vehicles (resulting in oversupply in the market), declining car affordability, shifting consumer 
preferences from new to used vehicles, and continuing entry by Asian car manufacturers (even in 
segments traditionally dominated by American car companies) (Carson in Klier, 2004; US 
International Trade Administration, 2005; Reynolds, 2017). The resulting increased competition 
steadily eroded the high profit margins which US car makers previously had enjoyed. This led to 
prioritization of cost reductions, the closing and restructuring of manufacturing plants, cutbacks to 
capital spending, and postponement of automation plans (UK House of Commons, 2004; US 
International Trade Administration, 2005). 
 
The European market was unable to balance the effects of this contraction because the concurrent 
rapid rise in oil prices offset potential increased demand for cars in continental Europe (European 
Parliament Director General for Research, 2001; KUKA AG, 2005). Furthermore, commodity 
super-cycles (mainly brought about by China’s significant demands for such goods) led to 
skyrocketing of prices of essential inputs (i.e. steel) for robotics production (Magne & Frécaut, 
2009). 
 
These factors in combination suggest that the mid-2000s was a period of ‘perfect storm:’ robotics 
companies were plagued by both supply- and demand-side pressures. Shrinking demand in 
traditional markets and rising business costs forced robotics producers to rethink their operations. 
While opinions regarding the vulnerability of the business to business cycles vary (see 
Management Discussion in COMAU’s Annual Report 2004 and KUKA AG’s Annual Report 2004 
for contrasting perspectives), most automation solutions providers decided it was necessary to 
diversify their demand portfolios and increase the value propositions of their products. 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
Our objective in this paper was to understand the evolution of contemporary, high-technology 
robotic companies’ knowledge base, the development of their technical capabilities, and the 
shifting in their knowledge accumulation strategies over time. We were interested in how the 
companies prepared to cope with trends such as the emergence of interactive robots and digital 
manufacturing.  
 
The methodology we adopted offers the reader a variety evidence to allow a better understanding 
of the evolution and accumulation strategy employed by European incumbent robotics firms with 
regard to their knowledge base. We think that a nuanced understanding of past actions is needed 
to predict advances in an industry which is likely to become the foundation for digital 
manufacturing developments and a large number of service industries (not discussed in this paper). 
Our literature review and study of the robotic industry’s evolution portray incumbent robotics 
firms as conservative organizations deploying incremental knowledge accumulation strategies 
(resulting in incremental growth in their knowledge bases) that is heavily influenced by the 
requirements of users.  On the other hand, recent developments in the sector more broadly have 
opened the way to new high-technology companies that are seemingly able to explore 
opportunities and offer radical innovation, thus creating new markets. Between these two, which 
of these portrayals best captures the behavior of the two leading robotics companies in Europe? 
How did they respond to challenges to their competitive advantage? Did they employ similar 
innovation strategies? 
 
The case studies suggest that the truth lies somewhere in between. Our analysis shows that the 
studied firms recognized the need to adapt although the shifts were gradual. Based on stylized facts 
derived from patent data, it is clear that shift competencies take time and that accumulated 
capabilities often are retained. While we have only superficially captured the evolution and 
adoption of background and niche technological competencies in our case firms, we show that 
there is relative consistency in their development of core competencies. Company archive material 
suggests also that external economic shocks and market expansion were stronger triggers of 
organizational change.  
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Our results indicate that high-technological diversity is a core feature of large European robotics 
firms. There is no evidence to suggest that they were inclined to increase this diversity further 
when a new technological opportunity arose. Also, matching of these data to the firms’ 
technological profiles indicates that this high mix is based mostly on a large set of marginal 
competencies and a smaller set of core competencies. Together, these support the idea that robotics 
firms’ capability-building is aimed more at maintaining absorptive capacity than increasing their 
technical skills (which the ‘learning-by-doing’ dynamic predicts). Firms’ current knowledge bases 
seem appropriate not for pursuing revolutionary innovations but for guaranteeing comprehensive 
developments in other technological areas. These observations can be compared to recent research 
which shows that the robotics sector requires its actors to be highly relational and to have 
capabilities that bridge across disciplines, industries, applications, and knowledge (Leigh & Kraft, 
2016). Also, the stylized facts suggest that core competence-building (i.e. computer-related 
capabilities) takes a significant amount of time.  
 
The study provides only very limited support for our predictions about an exploitation-exploration 
tradeoff where firms (such as contemporary robotics companies) increase their distant search 
(exploration) and decrease their local search (exploitation) in order to be able to respond to ongoing 
and anticipated changes (such as, increasing need for software-related capabilities in robotics 
products) while maintaining optimal use of resources. COMAU and KUKA responded differently 
to their environment – KUKA demonstrated the expected change in the exploitation-exploration 
mix but COMAU did not commit to any significant rebalancing. Expected tradeoffs between local 
and distant search (or the exploitation vs. exploration dynamic) occurred only in limited periods; 
more significant, was the parallel increases in both search scope and COMAU’s local search 
tendencies,12 and the continuing level of self-citations compared to   the dynamic search traits in 
KUKA’s knowledge base throughout the period studied. These observations provide strong 
support for the notion of exploration-exploitation dynamics being orthogonal rather than 
contrasting activities within a trade-off which are available to resource-rich organizations. 
 
                                                 
12 This shift is seemingly driven by COMAU’s acquisition of other companies cited in its previously patent applications (i.e. Renault 
Automation, Sciaky Industries) 
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There is a level of stability across all our measures. Apart from the notable stability in 
technological diversity, there are comparable (albeit limited) consistencies in the other measures 
(i.e. relatedness of developed core competencies, stability of search combinations). Collectively, 
these confirm the routinized and cumulative nature of the evolutionary firm. Similar to the 
observations in Ahuja and Katila (2004) regarding chemical firms, the case robotics firms 
exhibited a strong tendency for maintaining established knowledge-acquiring activities across 
time. In line again with Ahuja Katila’s (2004) findings, the changes observed in these enterprises 
were incremental but dynamic. 
 
However, our qualitative and quantitative exploration of the innovative behavior of two leading 
robotics firms underscores the effect of context specificities (and how they produce heterogeneous 
firm responses). COMAU maintained a conservative approach with a significant refocusing on 
core activities during the mid-2000s followed by attention to economic performance while KUKA 
showed a stronger inclination for technological diversification. COMAU’s conservatism might be 
explained by its extensive links to the FIAT Group (now FCA Group); its innovative behavior may 
have been influenced significantly by its parent company’s corporate strategy i.e. cost cutting and 
survival in the late 1990s early 2000s, and modernization of Chrysler’s plants in the FCA Group 
during the late 2000s and early 2010s. News reports in the most recent years suggest that the FCA 
Group is following a strategy of listing and selling some of its most valuable controlled companies 
(see the listing of Ferrari and sale of Magneti Marelli) to raise capital – it might be that COMAU 
will be the next to go.13 If so, pursuing a risky diversification strategy could have negative impacts 
on COMAU’s profitability making it less attractive to future investors. The firm’s conservative 
behavior could be the result of financial targets rather than strategic technological decisions. We 
acknowledge that this interpretation might be affected by our reduced patent sample for COMAU 
since part of its patenting output could have been concentrated in the FCA Group’s designated 
R&D laboratories (cursory investigation reveals that Centro Ricerche has had substantial patenting 
output in robotic related areas in recent years), especially after the 2007 consolidation of FIAT’s 
research efforts in its two main labs. Thus, there might be sample bias if FIAT/FCA made the 
                                                 
13 Such strategy can result in a reduction of the debt of FCA but at the same time in a loss of control of most valuable competences 
in the area of digital manufacturing. However, the willingness of the FCA Group to sell COMAU may be attributable to limited 
R&D activity already being carried out in the company. 
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strategic decision to retain in the mother company the most strategically relevant patents related 
to technological diversification.    
 
In contrast, KUKA after its restructuring, refocused on diversifying its robotics production into 
more advanced robotics fields. KUKA leveraged its expertise and expanded into non-traditional 
applications such as interactive robots and medical robots, via various acquisitions in the Reis 
Group and Swisslog Holding AG. This allowed KUKA to gain familiarity in these areas without 
a lengthy capability-building process. In January 2017, the Midea Group bought 74.55% of the 
voting stocks of KUKA for EURO 4.5 Billion; this was a strategic investment for the Chinese 
group founded on the very high potential growth of the Chinese robotics market.  
 
Another aspect of the restructuring processes was the quite abrupt shifts in the firms’ behavior 
which points to the stronger impact of internal reorganization relative to any environmental 
stimuli. Their internal restructuring brought about the most sweeping organizational changes. 
However, we are unable to determine the exact relationship between these activities. An internal 
reorganization can affect all firm aspects in quite dramatic ways. For instance, changes to 
employee counts and the firm’s activities can contribute to shifts in its knowledge-related 
heuristics. It is possible also, that the routinized behavior within the organization before the mid-
2000s was based more on success than on failure, causing the firm inadvertently to focus on short-
run objectives and neglect long-run adaptability (Levinthal & March, 1993).  Attempts could be 
made to disentangle and isolate the effects of intra-firm change (in particular, restructuring 
programs and M&A deals) on modifying the enterprises’ overall innovative behavior. There is a 
growing strand of work that explores the particular effects of M&A activities in innovative 
behavior (among others, Cloodt, et. al., 2006), with an increasing number of studies focused 
particularly on M&A strategies in relation to pharmaceutical and life sciences companies (see 
among others, Prabhu, et. al., 2005; Mittra, 2007). Firms facing radical technological changes use 
acquisition as a strategy to acquire new sets of competencies rapidly (see Google’s acquisition 
strategy). It might be possible also to determine the effect of the firms’ position within its supply 
chain (or within the broader global value chain). Being part of a large network of affiliated 
companies (i.e. COMAU) vs. being an individual ‘retailer’ of capital goods (i.e. KUKA) may have 
affected these firms’ innovative heuristics. Future research could extend the analyses in several 
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directions. First, research could attempt to identify explicit and quantifiable relationships among 
the selected set of measures on innovative behavior and firms’ competitive advantage and 
performance. 
 
In terms of our initial research questions, can we say that there are historical antecedents supporting 
the expectation that robotics companies generally are able to radical innovations? Can they be 
expected to revolutionize manufacturing? Are the latest attention-grabbing robots in the media 
representative of where the industry is now or will be in ten years’ time? Overall, our finds seem 
to indicate that robotics companies are not the harbingers of a revolutionary future they often are 
seen as; they tend to prefer continuity and are likely to remain in familiar territory. While these 
enterprises are attentive to current developments in their external environment, they are highly 
selective about which to assimilate into their established operations. High-technology firms 
respond conservatively to external stimuli; internal shifts bring about very noticeable and abrupt 
changes to their innovative propensities. More broadly, they add to the many examples in the 
history of technology suggesting the lengthy process involved and organizational boundedness of 
technological progress. Going from the moment of the first appearance of a new technology –e.g. 
smart robots- to mass production requires major accumulation of new technological knowledge by 
producing firms and significant organizational changes in adopting firms. In some cases, 
incumbent firms are unable to adapt (see the case of Kodak and digital photography), in others 
acquisition of small innovative companies allows the dominant player to survive (see the evolution 
of the pharmaceutical industry and the emergence of biotechnology). 
 
These notions of the firm have important business and policy implications. The accounting focus 
in industry peers’ actions and development during benchmarking exercises may be limited for 
providing the firm with the necessary perspectives for sustained growth. Contemporaries may be 
similarly shortsighted in their anticipation of external threats and may be conservative in their 
search for opportunities. Setting courses of action based on existing paradigms can inevitably link 
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Appendix A. Documentation on methodology 
The technological diversification measure is calculated by comparing the firms’ 4-digit level IPC 
subclasses-based diversification indices. An index is derived from a, a set of unique IPC subclasses 
constructed for each stock-year from 1991 to 2015. This approach and specification is based on 
the recommendations of earlier studies (van Zeebroeck, et.al., 2006; Caviggioli, 2016).  
Following Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco (2007), the technological diversification 
measure is specified as follows 
𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛: 1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 1 −  �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖2
𝑖𝑖
 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 denotes the proportion of patents in technical field 𝑖𝑖. The index is equal to zero when a 
firm researches only in a singular technology and approximates unity when the enterprise spreads 
its research activities over a wide technological base (Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 
2007). Consistent with Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco’s (2007) use, patents assigned to 
multiple technical fields have been treated as different applications. 
The technological competence profiling is conducted via the Patel & Pavitt’s (1997) technological 
profile matrix, which relies on a combination of Revealed Technological Advantage (RTA) and 
patent share (PS) to map out firms’ technological capabilities. RTA is calculated as follows: 




wherein 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of patents of firm 𝑖𝑖 that belongs to IPC class 𝑗𝑗 applied with the EPO. 
Because of data constraints, we had to rely on the OECD data on all patent applications to the EPO 
from 1987 to 2014. Meanwhile, PS is calculated as the share of a particular IPC subclass in the 
firm’s total IPC subclasses for a particular stock-year. Table A1 provides the matrix’s 
classifications and their respective RTA & PS conditions. 
 
Table A1. Patel & Pavitt's (1997) classification of technological competencies,  
Classification RTA condition PS condition 
Core technology RTA > 2.0 PS > 3.0 % 
Background technology RTA < 2.0 PS > 3.0 % 
Marginal RTA < 2.0 PS < 3.0 % 
Niche RTA > 2.0 PS < 3.0 % 
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The competencies are defined as follows: core as the firm’s distinctive technical competencies, 
niche as those that are distinctive but are relatively small technological fields, background that are 
competencies wherein the firm allots significant resources but is unable to achieve a relatively high 
advantage because of the field’s size, and marginal in which the firm neither allocates sizeable 
resources nor achieves distinct advantages (Patel & Pavitt, 1997). 
The local-distant search measure is studied through a comparative analysis of Katila & Ahuja’s 
(2002) search scope measure and Rosenkopf & Nerkar’s (2001) self-citation measure. Both 
measures first are calculated based on the unique patent citations (and their corresponding 
assignees) made for each stock-year; from that dataset, a firm citation stock was calculated as: 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
=  𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖                                                                        
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−1 + ⋯+ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−4 
The search scope is calculated as: 




wherein new citations are citations that were made in 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆ℎ 𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖   but not in 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆ℎ 𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−1 and 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 are 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 .  
The self-citation measure is calculated as: 




wherein self-citations are citations of the firm’s, its subsidiaries’, and affiliated organizations’ 




Appendix B. COMAU SpA (Italian operations) financial highlights 2008 - 2015, in thousands 
EUR 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  Average  
Current assets 527,805 324,025 249,547 388,778 432,369 591,894 896,354 1,083,279 561,756 
Total assets (TA) 718,537 519,776 450,467 517,310 582,206 752,832 1,037,334 1,196,890 721,919 
Non-current liabilities 87,758 91,789 67,977 85,662 69,855 73,251 60,778 58,886 74,494 
Current liabilities 544,639 347,618 285,085 358,933 430,218 589,650 828,571 967,504 544,027 
Total liabilities (TL) 632,397 439,407 353,062 444,595 500,073 662,901 889,349 1,026,390 618,522 
Operating revenue 446,707 200,053 234,403 344,392 343,835 359,971 464,452 486,232 360,006 
Period P/L (Net income) -15,805 -45,771 -22,964 -144,691 9,418 7,798 58,054 22,514 -16,431 
No. of employees  1,626   1,217   1,070   1,042   1,112   1,187   1,277   1,309   1,230  
Current (working capital) ratio  0.97   0.93   0.88   1.08   1.00   1.00   1.08   1.12   1.01  
TL/TA ratio  0.88   0.85   0.78   0.86   0.86   0.88   0.86   0.86   0.85  
Source: Amadeus database (2018) 
